Text of ElBaradei's Statement
Monday January 27, 2003 7:40 PM
The following is the text of International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei's statement to the United Nations on Monday concerning the status of nuclear inspections in Iraq:
The status of nuclear inspections in Iraq: For the past 60 days, the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency have been engaged in the process of verifying the existence or absence of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq.
Today, pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1441, I have submitted to the President of the Security Council an updated report on our progress since we resumed our nuclear verification activities in Iraq in terms of the approach we have adopted, the tools we have used, the specific results achieved, the degree of cooperation we have received, and finally our view on how we should proceed. Let in me in this statement outline the key aspects of this report.
BACKGROUND: UNDERSTANDING THE STARTING POINT
To understand the approach of the IAEA's inspection over the past two months, it is important first to recall what was accomplished during our inspections from 1991 to 1998, in fulfillment of our Security Council mandate to eliminate Iraq's nuclear weapons program.
In September 1991, the IAEA seized documents in Iraq that demonstrated the extent of its nuclear weapons program. By the end of 1992, we had largely destroyed, removed or rendered harmless all Iraqi facilities and equipment relevant to nuclear weapons production.
We confiscated Iraq's nuclear-weapons-usable material - high-enriched uranium and plutonium - and by early 1994 we had removed it from the country. By December 1998, when the inspections were brought to a halt with a military strike imminent, we were confident that we had not missed any significant component of Iraq's nuclear program. While we did not claim absolute certainty, our conclusion at that time was that we had neutralized Iraq's nuclear weapons program and that there were no indications that Iraq retained any physical capability to produce weapon-usable nuclear material.
During the intervening four years of our absence from Iraq, we continued our analytical work to the best of our ability, using satellite imagery and other information. But no remote analysis can replace onsite inspection and we were, therefore, not able to reach any conclusions about Iraq's compliance with its Security Council obligations in the nuclear field after December 1998.
CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS TO DATE
Against this backdrop, when Iraq agreed last September to reopen its doors to inspection, and following the subsequent adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1441, which strengthened the IAEA's authority and the inspection process, the first goal of our inspection activities was ``reconnaissance.'' In this phase, we sought to re-establish rapidly our knowledge base of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, to ensure that key facilities had not been reopened, to verify the location of nuclear material and relevant non-nuclear material, and to identify and begin interviewing key Iraqi personnel.
Over these first two months of inspection, we have made good progress in our knowledge of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, with a total of 139 inspections at some 106 locations to date. The bulk of these inspections have taken place at state-run or private industrial facilities, research centers and universities; either at locations where Iraq's significant technical capabilities were known to have existed in the past, or at new locations suggested by remote monitoring and analysis.
All inspection activities have been carried out without prior notification to Iraq, except where notification was needed to ensure the availability of required support. IAEA inspectors have taken and will continue to take full advantage of the inspection authority granted by resolution 1441. In doing so, the inspectors have been instructed to make every effort to conduct their activities with appropriate professionalism and sensitivity.
While we are continuing to some extent with this reconnaissance work, our inspections are now well into the ``investigative'' phase with particular emphasis on determining what, if anything, has occurred in Iraq over the past four years relevant to the re-establishment of nuclear capabilities. These investigative inspections focus on areas of concern identified by other states, facilities identified through satellite imagery as having been modified or constructed since 1998, and other inspection leads identified independently by the IAEA.
In parallel with these inspection activities, the IAEA has been conducting exhaustive analysis of supporting information obtained from various sources. In this context, we have integrated the new information submitted by Iraq including the declaration submitted on Dec. 7 in response to resolution 1441 with the records we had accumulated between 1991 and 1998, and the additional information we had compiled through remote monitoring since 1998.
The Iraqi declaration was consistent with our existing understanding of Iraq's pre-1991 nuclear program. However, it did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998, in particular regarding Iraq's progress prior to 1991 related to weapons design and centrifuge development. While these questions do not constitute unresolved disarmament issues, they nevertheless need further clarification.
In addition to onsite inspection and offsite analysis, IAEA inspectors have employed a variety of tools to accomplish their mission. Taking advantage of the ``signature'' of radioactive materials, we have resumed the monitoring of Iraq's rivers, canals and lakes to detect the presence of certain radioisotopes. A broad variety of environmental samples and surface swipe samples have been collected from locations across Iraq and taken to IAEA laboratories for analysis. And we have re-instituted routine car-borne and hand-held gamma surveys for the detection of undeclared nuclear material.
Monday January 27, 2003 7:40 PM
The following is the text of International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei's statement to the United Nations on Monday concerning the status of nuclear inspections in Iraq:
The status of nuclear inspections in Iraq: For the past 60 days, the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency have been engaged in the process of verifying the existence or absence of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq.
Today, pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1441, I have submitted to the President of the Security Council an updated report on our progress since we resumed our nuclear verification activities in Iraq in terms of the approach we have adopted, the tools we have used, the specific results achieved, the degree of cooperation we have received, and finally our view on how we should proceed. Let in me in this statement outline the key aspects of this report.
BACKGROUND: UNDERSTANDING THE STARTING POINT
To understand the approach of the IAEA's inspection over the past two months, it is important first to recall what was accomplished during our inspections from 1991 to 1998, in fulfillment of our Security Council mandate to eliminate Iraq's nuclear weapons program.
In September 1991, the IAEA seized documents in Iraq that demonstrated the extent of its nuclear weapons program. By the end of 1992, we had largely destroyed, removed or rendered harmless all Iraqi facilities and equipment relevant to nuclear weapons production.
We confiscated Iraq's nuclear-weapons-usable material - high-enriched uranium and plutonium - and by early 1994 we had removed it from the country. By December 1998, when the inspections were brought to a halt with a military strike imminent, we were confident that we had not missed any significant component of Iraq's nuclear program. While we did not claim absolute certainty, our conclusion at that time was that we had neutralized Iraq's nuclear weapons program and that there were no indications that Iraq retained any physical capability to produce weapon-usable nuclear material.
During the intervening four years of our absence from Iraq, we continued our analytical work to the best of our ability, using satellite imagery and other information. But no remote analysis can replace onsite inspection and we were, therefore, not able to reach any conclusions about Iraq's compliance with its Security Council obligations in the nuclear field after December 1998.
CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS TO DATE
Against this backdrop, when Iraq agreed last September to reopen its doors to inspection, and following the subsequent adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1441, which strengthened the IAEA's authority and the inspection process, the first goal of our inspection activities was ``reconnaissance.'' In this phase, we sought to re-establish rapidly our knowledge base of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, to ensure that key facilities had not been reopened, to verify the location of nuclear material and relevant non-nuclear material, and to identify and begin interviewing key Iraqi personnel.
Over these first two months of inspection, we have made good progress in our knowledge of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, with a total of 139 inspections at some 106 locations to date. The bulk of these inspections have taken place at state-run or private industrial facilities, research centers and universities; either at locations where Iraq's significant technical capabilities were known to have existed in the past, or at new locations suggested by remote monitoring and analysis.
All inspection activities have been carried out without prior notification to Iraq, except where notification was needed to ensure the availability of required support. IAEA inspectors have taken and will continue to take full advantage of the inspection authority granted by resolution 1441. In doing so, the inspectors have been instructed to make every effort to conduct their activities with appropriate professionalism and sensitivity.
While we are continuing to some extent with this reconnaissance work, our inspections are now well into the ``investigative'' phase with particular emphasis on determining what, if anything, has occurred in Iraq over the past four years relevant to the re-establishment of nuclear capabilities. These investigative inspections focus on areas of concern identified by other states, facilities identified through satellite imagery as having been modified or constructed since 1998, and other inspection leads identified independently by the IAEA.
In parallel with these inspection activities, the IAEA has been conducting exhaustive analysis of supporting information obtained from various sources. In this context, we have integrated the new information submitted by Iraq including the declaration submitted on Dec. 7 in response to resolution 1441 with the records we had accumulated between 1991 and 1998, and the additional information we had compiled through remote monitoring since 1998.
The Iraqi declaration was consistent with our existing understanding of Iraq's pre-1991 nuclear program. However, it did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998, in particular regarding Iraq's progress prior to 1991 related to weapons design and centrifuge development. While these questions do not constitute unresolved disarmament issues, they nevertheless need further clarification.
In addition to onsite inspection and offsite analysis, IAEA inspectors have employed a variety of tools to accomplish their mission. Taking advantage of the ``signature'' of radioactive materials, we have resumed the monitoring of Iraq's rivers, canals and lakes to detect the presence of certain radioisotopes. A broad variety of environmental samples and surface swipe samples have been collected from locations across Iraq and taken to IAEA laboratories for analysis. And we have re-instituted routine car-borne and hand-held gamma surveys for the detection of undeclared nuclear material.